STUDY- IED sufferings in AF-Pak (updated 11 August)

by Editor | March 30, 2012 11:16 am

The Perceptors Group took up an in depth study on issue of human sufferings specifically due to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) attacks causing immense human loss in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The group observed some of the reports, pointing fingers towards Pakistan for either involvement or having lax control on IED material transportation which is a main cause of concern.

To ensure the credibility of report, the study group collected secondary data from diversified sources ranging from studies done by other credible groups, individual research of intellectuals and government based facts and figures released from time to time. The below mentioned data also include information from US and Pakistan’s officially released figures and international NGOs, Think tanks working on both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The report also has some primary data from updated government official reports.

The report intends highlighting the human sufferings due to terrorism on one end and on the other exposes the perceptions being raised and played by interested elements.

Perceptions

US Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat, in US Senate hearing raised the issue of IEDs, claiming that Pakistan remained the main source of the materials used for making the devices. During same hearing Gen James Mattis termed it an area of frustration and serious topic of dialogue with Pakistan. (Read here) US Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, who serves on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote in a column in newsmax that “America must realize that Pakistan is the “Benedict Arnold” to America in the war on terror. The Administration’s request to send more money to Pakistan must be denied.” (Read here)
Same is the voice of US military, according to US JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO), the Pentagon’s lead agency for combating makeshift bombs, the leaky border with Pakistan remains a problem. JIEDDO says that Pakistan contributes 80 percent of the fertilizer-based homemade bombs in Afghanistan that cause 90 percent of U.S. casualties.

Facts

The IEDs attacks alone in Pakistan has taken lives of 2707soldiers whereas 1188 NATO soldiers became prey of IEDs in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2012.
In 2010/2011 the causality figures of only Pakistan’s Civil Armed forces (CAF) operating in Balochistan and in Fata is 176. The number of Army and other LEA in area is expected to be much more.
As of 2010, Pakistani check posts on the Pakistan-Afghan border numbered 821 against 112 check posts set up by NATO-US-Afghan troops on their side. The NATO and U.S forces comprise of 50 countries therefore lack priority to curbing cross-border movement.
Total number of Pakistan’s troops operating on Pak-Afghan border is approx 140,000 and NATO-ISAF are approx 128,961 as at 12 April 2012.
Pakistan has undertaken major efforts to stop the free flow of Urea to Afghanistan including cutting dealership in northern region and changing the color of fertilizer to track it but still this fertilizer is coming and being used against security forces engaged in FATA and Balochistan area and Afghanistan.
The data compairing number of IED attacks and number of casualties show that from 2006 to 2012 on Afghan side 44659 IED attacks casued 118 deaths and on Pak side 4828 IED attacks caused 2707 deaths . This shows better techniques of identifying and handling IED attacks by coalition forces on Afghan side.
According to a Telegraph report of 2009, “US Marines captured a vast cache of IEDs made from agricultural ammonium nitrate fertiliser in 25 kilogram bags indistinguishable from the thousands of tons of fertiliser supplied to Afghanistan under Western aid programmes. It has long been obvious that many of the roadside bombs used to kill British and other Western troops are made from fertiliser paid for by UK and other Western taxpayers.” (Read here)
A US delegation has visited a fertilizer industry in Multan during December 2011 to seek the cooperation to stop the flow of fertilizer. According to Fawad Mukhtar CEO of Pak Arab Fertilizers, ”It is wrong to single Pakistan and us out, especially as we are doing all that they want us to do, We have told them that this is made throughout the region and Pakistan is not the only source. We have also told them that huge quantities of this fertilizer are made in Iran, Uzbekistan and across Central Asia.”
The company involved in production of fertilizers has changed the identification of bags by using different colours and has cut down dealership in the northern region and reduced its supplies. Moreover samples of fertilizer handed over to US delegation experimenting colour change. Efforts are in hand for legislation for production, sale and use of fertilizers in Pakistan. While on the contrary if one looks at US history, it took them 15 years after Oklahoma bombing, for legislation.
According to agricultural reports Pakistan is amongst those countries having acutest shortage of water and per capita water availability ranks dead last in the list of 26 Asian countries. The US authorities have totally ignored this fact that huge quantities of ammonium nitrate are produced in half a dozen neighboring countries of Afghanistan – Iran, Uzbekistan, Central Asia and China with 68% nitric acid composition. European countries also make huge quantity of ammonium nitrate which goes up to 2.89 million tons.
Executives with the US chemical manufacturer Honeywell traveled to Pakistan to pitch Pakarab on the merits of Sulf-N 26, a fertilizer that combines ammonium nitrate with ammonium sulfate, a fertilizer and fire retardant. However, tests carried out in the US showed it could still be used in the production of bombs and the project was shelved, according to Pakarab and Best, the expert at the Joint IED Defeat Organization. Honeywell, which said it had not been informed about the tests, disputed that conclusion. (Read here) This report indicates that investment on Sulf-N26 can be risky if it does not prevent making of IEDs from fertilizers.

Conclusion

In backdrop of perceived accusations on Pakistan and its forces, data was collected to ascertain facts. An effort was made to collect data on causalities in general and IEDs related causalities in particular to draw a comparison and come out with conclusion to help find the intensity of problem and give a way forward for security decision makers and help them make their policy based on fact and fight false perceptions. All conclusions are supported by figures and graphs included in the study. Main conclusions are as under:

The collected figures and data draw a gloomy picture contrary to US view and general perception of the international media. Unfortunately, Pakistan never presented its case to the world. The fact is that Pakistan is a victim of IEDs attack and Afghanistan and NATO troops are far behind in causalities and loss. NATO lost 1188 soldiers and 2707 Pakistani security personnel scarified their lives due to IEDs attack from 2006 to 2012( See Figure and Table.3).
Data conclude that both sides of the Pak-Afghan borders are under attack by IED. However Pakistan has taken more practical steps by constructing 812 Check posts on its side against 112 check posts being manned by NATO-ISAF to control the approximately 2,640 kilometers long border with Pakistan.
When compared the number of casualty per IED attack it was significantly found that human loss on Pakistan side were much more than on Afghanistan side ( Figure.1 and Figure.2).
On civilians count, the annual death toll from terrorist attacks has risen from 164 in 2003 to 3318 in 2009, with a total of 35,000 Pakistanis killed as of 2010 and this toll is on the rise.
According to the government of Pakistan, the direct and indirect economic costs of terrorism from 2000-2010 is $68 billion. US Ambassador to Pakistan, Camron Munter publicly acknowledged this loss, “as you and I both know, the (IEDs) threat is equally dire in Pakistan. In 2010, there were about 3,700 Pakistani civilian causalities from IEDs and home-made explosives – road-side bombs, car bombs, suicide bombs. This nearly equals the numbers for Iraq and Afghanistan combined.” (Read here)
Pakistan has taken many steps to stop the menace of IEDs attack, rather than cooperating with Pakistan, blame game and putting conditions on Pakistan has undermine the efforts and will result in favour of hostile forces. US Gen. John R. Allen also admitted the IED problem to Pakistan in a press briefing (dated 26 March 2012) that “we would always enjoy Pakistani military assistance across the border, but I will tell you that they’re deeply engaged across the border. In the last couple of years, they’ve suffered 3,000 dead and a couple of thousand wounded, and they have an IED problem from the Taliban on their side of the border that is substantial as well. “ (Read here)
NATO and US associate these IEDs attack to the free flow of fertilizer from Pakistan but Pakistani authorities have made efforts to stop the eminent threat from publicly available fertilizers. Emerging Asia’s report on “Afghanistan’s Fertilizer Market” reveals that Pakistan is not the single exporter of fertilizers to Afghanistan. It is usually imported to Afghanistan largely from the US, Australia, China, Pakistan, with smaller quantities from Tajikistan, Iran, Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia. Another fertilizer used in lesser quantity is Mono Ammonium Phosphate from Iran. Fertilizer from the US and Australia is typically exported to Pakistan where it is repackaged and then exported to Afghanistan. (Read more). Afghanistan’s borders are porous from all neighboring states and these fertilizers can be smuggled from all sides.

Updated on 8 Jun 2012

GAO Report on Roadside Bombs

What GAO Found

Multiple U.S. agencies and international partners are engaged in efforts to assist Pakistan in countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but face a variety of ongoing challenges. The agencies providing counter-IED assistance to Pakistan are primarily the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ). The following table identifies the types of assistance these U.S. agencies have provided and the corresponding objectives of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Strategy. According to U.S. officials, U.S. agencies have encountered ongoing challenges to their efforts to assist Pakistan, such as delays in obtaining visas and in the delivery of equipment. U.S. officials have also identified broader challenges to Pakistan’s ability to counter IEDs, including the extreme difficulty of interdicting smugglers along its porous border with Afghanistan. In addition, though Pakistan developed a National Counter-IED Strategy in June 2011, it has yet to finalize an implementation plan for carrying out the strategy.
The U.S. fiscal year 2013 Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (MSRP) for Pakistan includes a new performance indicator to track some of Pakistan’s efforts to counter IEDs, but the indicator and targets used to measure progress do not cover the full range of U.S. assisted efforts. The performance indicator focuses on cross-border activities, specifically on Pakistan’s efforts to prevent illicit commerce in sensitive materials, including chemical precursors used to manufacture IEDs in Afghanistan. As such, progress of U.S. counter-IED assistance efforts not specifically linked to cross-border smuggling are not covered, such as counter-IED training and/or equipment, a counter-IED public awareness campaign, and legal assistance for laws and regulations to counter-IEDs and IED precursors. Consequently, effects of key U.S. assisted counter-IED efforts are not tracked under the existing performance indicator and related targets. The absence of comprehensive performance measures that reflect the broad range of U.S. assisted counter-IED efforts limits State’s ability to track overall progress in Pakistan to counter IEDs and to determine the extent to which these counter-IED efforts are helping to achieve the U.S. goals.

Why GAO Did This Study

Improvised explosive devices have been a significant cause of fatalities among U.S. troops in Afghanistan. About 80 percent of the IEDs contain homemade explosives, primarily calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) fertilizer smuggled from Pakistan. U.S. officials recognize the threat posed by the smuggling of CAN and other IED precursors from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and State and other agencies are assisting Pakistan’s government to counter this threat. This report (1) describes the status of U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan in countering IEDs and (2) reviews State’s tracking of U.S. assisted efforts in Pakistan to counter IEDs. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency strategy and programmatic documents, including State’s fiscal year 2013 MSRP for Pakistan. GAO also met with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., Arlington, Virginia, and Tampa, Florida; and met with U.S. and Pakistani officials in Islamabad, Pakistan.

What GAO Recommends

To improve State’s ability to track progress of efforts in Pakistan to counter IEDs, GAO recommends that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. Mission in Pakistan to enhance its counter-IED performance measures to cover the full range of U.S. assisted efforts. State concurred and committed to look for ways to broaden the scope of existing metrics in order to better reflect and evaluate interagency participation in counter-IED efforts.

Complete Report

STUDY DATA

( Due to incomplete registered data on Pakistan side the below may not be the total figure but gives fair idea of the problem)

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks and Deaths (Security Personnel) in Pakistan, 2006-2012

Year	IED Attacks	Deaths
2006	646	222
2007	1,046	376
2008	912	814
2009	1,308	1,104
2010	373	76
2011	510	100
2012 uptill mid march	29	15
Total	4824	2707

(Figure and Table.1)

The above-mentioned data and graph represents that almost every IED attack on Pakistani security forces was more fatal than the attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan. On Pak side IED attack fig of 4824 may in actual be a bit more as this record mostly include frontier Corps.

Note:- Security forces figure of 2010/2011 pertains to Civil Armed Forces (CAF) operating in Fata and Balochistan. Figures of other LEAs and Army operating in area are expected to be much more.

IED Attacks and Deaths(NATO) in Afghanistan, 2006-2012

Year	IED Attacks	Deaths
2006	797	41
2007	1147	78
2008	1632	152
2009	9,304	275
2010	15,225	368
2011	16,554	252
2012 uptill mid March	Not Available	22
Total	44659	1188

(Figure and Table.2)

These statistics shows that although IEDs explosions are higher in number but causalities toll is far low than the Pakistani scarifies. It is noted that there are 50 troops contributed nations in NATO-ISAF and total strength of NATO-ISAF in Afghanistan is 130,386 this figure is taken from ISAF troop number and placement as of 6 January, 2012. (Read here)

Comparison of IED related Deaths of Pak and NATO (Security Personnel), 2006-2012

Note:-Pakistan’s Security forces figure of 2010/2011/2012 is not complete and only pertains to Civil Armed Forces (CAF) operating in Fata and Balochistan. Figures of other LEAs and Army operating in area are expected to be much more.

Year	Pakistani Casualties	NATO Casualities
2006	222	41
2007	376	78
2008	814	152
2009	1,104	275
2010	76	368
2011	100	252
2012 uptill mid March	15	22
Total	2707	1188

(Figure and Table.3)

Combine comparison of NATO and Pakistani causalities shows that so far Pakistani security forces are actual victims of IEDs attacks.

Recommendations

After having analyzed the primary and secondary data showing problems faced by Pakistan and NATO forces the report recommends:

Pakistan needs to present its case to the world. Pakistan is the main victim of IEDs attack and its efforts have not got due coverage and recognition. The facts brought out in the study must be given maximum projection.
JIEDDO should expand its role by helping Pakistani authorities and security forces to eliminate rise in IEDs attacks. Sharing of Air Surveillance and on ground IEDs detection hardware (i.e PTDS, PGSS, GPR, Goldie, devil pup etc.) can be helpful to neutralize the threat along Pak-Afghan borders.
On diplomatic and political grounds, US congressional representatives and state official should realize the difficulties and contributions of Pakistan to the war on terrorism. As Ambassador Munter and Gen. John R. Allen made a clean breast that IEDs problem is not only with NATO forces but also a substantial issue on the Pakistani side. it took U.S 15 years after 1995 Oklahoma bombing, for legislation.
NATO must raise number of check posts along Pak-Afghan border, less security is favouring hostile forces to move freely on Afghan side and reorganize their strength to hit back on Pakistan’s side.
The international community be made to realize that Pakistan is amongst countries having acute shortage of water. Its per capita water availability ranks dead last in the list of 26 Asian countries that’s why fertilizer is crucial requirement for agricultural sector. Viable solutions be considered for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s government should hold an international conference on Terrorism especially IEDs effects on Pakistan society and economy. All regional stakeholders should be invited to discuss measures and share available technology to save human lives.

Seven simple steps to curb (IED using) terrorism in India

These steps can be implemented in Pakistan because apparently Pakistan is facing same dilemma. (Media Point)

August 06, 2012 16:53 IST

The steps that can be taken given below require the least amount of expenditure and can be implemented with existing institutional structure and laws. It must be understood that Improvised Explosive Device or IED remotely detonated or with timers are the most frequent tactic of the terrorists. The 26/11 like armed attack is more an exception than a rule, although a lone gunman or a small group of gunmen opening fire at a crowded place (like in the US) also remains a potent threat. By its very nature the threat of IED is confined to urban areas as the crowds that make mass casualties possible are to be found in that setting.STEP 1

The IED has three components, the timer/trigger, detonator & booster and explosive with shrapnel etc. Timer or trigger can easily be constructed with even an alarm clock and simple batteries or cell phones and is virtually impossible to control. But neither explosive material nor detonators are easily available. With tightening border control and some measures to account for dual use substances like ammonium nitrate fertilizer, this risk can be reduced.

Detonators and boosters are a key component in IEDs and not easily available and fall under the Explosives Act. The three possible sources of detonators and explosives are the armed forces and ordnance factories, private factories, quarrying/mining and the road construction industry. Enough checks exist in the armed forces and government factories.

The most likely sources of detonators and boosters are the private contractors engaged in mining/construction activity. To dry up the supply of this vital component to terrorists, a law needs to be passed to give exemplary punishment to those users who let the detonators/explosives fall into wrong hands. Violence in much of India has been controlled due to strict gun control law. Similar stringent law for control of detonators would go a long way in stopping IEDs.

STEP 2

All cities must establish a network of mohalla committees and housing societies to monitor all suspicious movement in their own locality. Each city must have a dedicated police officer to man this 24×7. This measure will enhance both intelligence gathering as well as alert police to movement of terrorists. Police can circulate photographs and information of the fugitive suspects to these committees. In short a city wide concept of ‘neighbourhood watch’ needs to be implemented immediately. This will cost next to nothing.

STEP 3

In many western countries the police or intelligence agencies have launched ‘sting operations’ to lure and nab would be terrorists BEFORE they commit an act of sabotage. It is time our security establishment did the same.

STEP 4

In all terrorist incidents the police are more concerned with the Big Fish. This is a mistake. It is necessary to come down hard on the foot soldiers or persons who provide support like transport or lodging to the terrorists. These individuals must be punished quickly and made to pay a price. The idea behind this logic is to cut off the terrorists from their supporters due to fear of retribution by the state.

Like guerrillas without help similarly terrorists without local help would be like fish out of water. Infringement of laws to support acts of terror either for money or due to ideology needs to be viewed seriously by both the police (and especially) the judiciary.

STEP 5

For the sake of God and country, the various agencies in field must shun turf battles and act in unison. For instance the Indian Army [ has been dealing with IED's for years and has accumulated enough experience in the field. It has bomb disposal units and equipment. Could not the Pune police co-ordinate with the CME (College of Military Engineering) located in Pune itself?

STEP 6

There is an urgent need to create a well thought out SOP or standard operating procedure in case of a terrorist incident. Once an incident is declared as a 'terrorist incident' by the designated authority (could be the police commissioner in case of a city) then all resources civil, military or private must come under the pre-designated commander. All agencies must be obliged to obey his orders. It is the lack of unified command and pooling of resources on 26/11 that resulted in the terrorists holding out for over 72 hours!

STEP 7

The judiciary must deal with terrorism related cases quickly and punish the mass murderers. It is time that the judiciary sheds its proclivity to give the benefit of doubt to the criminals while doubting the intention of the law enforcers. If not corrected in time, we may soon come to a situation where the honest policeman will prefer not to act!

Source: Rediff

Follow up of IEDs news upto 27 July, 2012

Militancy in Balochistan, KP declines: Report

By: Nation/Syed Danish Hussain | April 27, 2012

The militants active in Balochistan have not only increased their attacks against security forces but they are also adapting to modern guerilla techniques by using IEDs. In Baluchistan 54 IEDs were exploded in which 12 security forces personnel and 8 civilians were killed while 24 security forces personnel, one Razakar and 30 civilian were injured.Militants active in Baluchistan target energy and communication infrastructure frequently. About 26 out of 54 IEDs used during the first quarter of the year were aimed at gas pipelines, railway tracks and electricity pylons. 19 out of these 26 attacks were carried out against gas pipelines alone.The growing use of IEDs by Bloch militants underline the fact that Bloch insurgents are being trained modern techniques of guerilla warfare.

STUDY- IED sufferings in AF-Pak (updated 11 August)

What GAO Found

Why GAO Did This Study

What GAO Recommends

Seven simple steps to curb (IED using) terrorism in India

3 killed in Quetta IED blast

Captain among eight killed in IED attack in Khyber Agency

IEDs killed over 2,000 troops, civilians in KP, Balochistan

Tragedy averted: 12kg bomb planted near Safoora school defused

Militants mark beginning of Ramadan with 20 killings

Railway track damaged in Quetta blast

11 dead in Bajaur market blast

Seven simple steps to curb terrorism in India