Rawalpindi 23 January: The US Investigation Report into the Salala incident of 26th November 2011, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting into Shahadat (killing) of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injury to 13 others, was received by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Pakistan Army on the 24th of December 2011. The report received is the same unclassified version as available on the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Website. The analysis of the US Investigation Report has been carried out by Pakistan Military with a view to reiterate facts and correct the perspective.
Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are factually not correct. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26th November 2011 was the failure of US / ISAF to share its near-border operation with Pakistan at any level. This obviously was a major omission, as were several others, like the complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative / intricate Rules of Engagement as well as lack of unified military command in Afghanistan. In addition to the foregoing, US / ISAF violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It also carried out unprovoked engagement of Pakistani Posts located inside Pakistan violating the US / ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone.
The US Investigation Report is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to facts. Continued engagement by US / ISAF despite being informed about the incident at multiple levels by Pakistan Military within minutes of initiation of US / ISAF fire, belies the “self defence” and “proportional use of force” contention. Affixing partial responsibility of the incident on Pakistan is therefore, unjustified and unacceptable.
The detailed Pakistani Perspective on the US Investigation Report (which is the only version of Pakistan’s Report), approved by Pakistan’s Defence Committee of the Cabinet, is available on Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations’ (ISPR) website (www.ispr.gov.pk).
Background
An engagement between NATO/Afghan forces and the Pakistani Military (PAKMIL) left 24 PAKMIL soldiers dead and 13 injured. The incident took place on the Pakistan-Afghan border in an area where certain sections of that border are under dispute. The US Report acknowledges mishaps and miscommunication issues but ultimately determined that there was no violation of international law because the force used was in self-defense to protect the ground forces that had come under fire. The US Report determined that the engagement ceased after NATO forces realized that they were attacking a PAKMIL position but acknowledges that there were delays in this communication that resulted in the attacks continuing even after NATO officials in Kabul and the U.S. Government in Islamabad were aware that it was PAKMIL that was being attacked.
Comparison
Below is a comparison of the reports which serves to highlight many areas where the two parties are in agreement and those significant areas where there is still uncertainty or disagreement. A review of bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States is currently being conducted by the Parliament of Pakistan, including the 25/26 November incident.
|
Issues
|
CentCom Report
|
PAKMIL Position
|
|
Militant activities in the area:
|
The Maya village, located in an area near the AF-Pak border, was a logistics hub and training camp of a specifically identified Taliban group and its local leader. It was believed that approximately 25-30 insurgents were based there with an unknown number of insurgents in transit in the area at any time. It was believed that the civilian population was being driven out and oppressed for their goods and services.
|
The Mohmand area on the Pakistan side of the border had been successfully cleared of all Taliban and other insurgents by PAKMIL in Sept/Oct 2011. No terrorist activity had been reported in this area since September which had been confirmed by U.S. officials who had conducted reconnaissance missions of the area with the approval of the PAKMIL; therefore, initial reports that NATO was firing on suspected insurgents operating on the Pakistan side of the border were inconsistent with PAKMIL’s understanding of the situation.
|
|
Mission:
|
The mission was to deny insurgents safe haven by destroying the enemy training camp and insulating the tribal leaders from the Taliban and other insurgent groups allowing local leaders to reassert their authority and enable effective governance in the area. Ground forces expected a threat from small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades.
|
|
|
Preparation, coordination and communication regarding mission:
|
Before approving the mission Major General James Lancaster required that (1) the landing zone for the ground forces be moved further away from the border and (2) a confirmation that there were no PAK border posts in the area. The position was moved and a map was provided showing known PAK border posts. The map did not show the two border that were subsequently engaged. The mission was approved.
|
The two border posts that were attacked were located along the ridge line of a barren mountain side in plain sight. The helicopters and gunships that fired on the Pakistani soldiers on 25/26 November were equipped with state-of-the-art night vision devices that made it possible for NATO troops to distinguish between Taliban or other terrorist groups and deployment of the Pakistan Army.
PAKMIL asserts that the U.S. local commander visited these Pakistanis border posts a month prior to the attacks and was briefed about the Pakistani deployment pattern.
|
|
No advanced notice of operation:
|
The border communication center, which is comprised of a NATO team, an Afghan National Security Forces and a PAKMIL Liaison Officer (BCC) was not provided with a copy of the mission plan through “official channels” but received a “back channel” copy from “an interested third party”. There is uncertainty as to if and when any information about the mission could be released to PAKMIL based on the caveat “no release date/time before 25 2130D Nov 11”. A copy of the mission plan was not released to the PAKMIL until the operation was well underway and after the engagement of the PAKMIL border positions had ended.
ICEPAK which is comprised of NATO liaison officers and PAKMIL in Islamabad was not given a copy of the mission plan.
|
PAKMIL claims that they did not receive notice of any NATO/Afghan activity to take place in the vicinity of the border.
|
|
Origin of conflict:
|
At 2144 the first half of the ground forces were delivered to the site.
At 2206 all forces were on the ground. Ground forces requested the use of infra-red flares from the AH-64D.
At 2309 NATO/Afghan ground forces came under fire originating from the Pakistani border. The ground forces took cover in a building.
|
PAKMIL strongly disputes that any of its forces fired at NATO/Afghan forces.
Note: Since no advanced notice of the mission was communicated to the PAKMIL, if hostile activity were occurring in an area known to be inhabited by insurgents, PAKMIL would have assumed it was the insurgents and taken appropriate action to protect its borders from insurgents.
|
|
Action by local commanders.
|
The ground forces team leader (GFTL) called his supervisors and relayed his concern that the fire may be coming from PAKMIL elements. He requested a “show of force” from the F-15E to “display to the enemy that we have air superiority and is designated to prevent an escalation”.
At 2320 an F-15E flew over the area at high speed and low altitude dispensing flares; triggering flares to be also dispensed from the AC-130.
At 2322 it was reported to NATO (Regional Command East) that ground forces were being fired on. This was not reported to the BCC or ODRP.
At 2324 the AC-130H and the AH-64D engaged targets on the ridge. The AC-130H crossed into Pakistan airspace up to two nautical miles in order to engage the targets.
Shortly thereafter the GFTL called to verify there was no PAKMIL in the area. He received confirmation that there were none. This communication was wrong. The information that was actually provided was that NATO (Regional Command East) was “not tracking any PAKMIL posts [on their computer mapping data system] in that area”. This was understood to mean that there were none.
At 2327 this information was entered into the instant messaging system.
At 2340 PAKMIL at NATO (Regional Command East) reported that PAKMIL border posts were being engaged from Afghanistan. There was confusion and this was not immediately confirmed.
At 2350 a PAKMIL liaison officer at NATO (Regional Command East) was notified by PAKMIL that it was PAKMIL that was being fired on. NATO (Regional Command East) communicated this information to the BCC but not to ODRP.
Around 0000 a general location was given to PAKMIL at the BCC who was asked to confirm if there were border posts in the area. This general location was incorrect due to errors with map overlays. NATO had requested information on an area that was 14 km north of the actual engagement area.
A U.S. officer at NATO (Regional Command East) reported to HQ RCE that PAKMIL was reporting an attack against its border post “Volcano”.
At 0035 a NATO liaison officer to ODRP notified NATO’s joint operations center of the incident.
At 0039 an AH-64D engaged and destroyed a tripod weapon inside the bunker.
At 0054 an AH-64D and AC-130H fired at a bi-pod weapon and at “hostile personnel” in a second area.
At 0055 NATO (Regional Command-East) received word from NATO Joint Command (HQ IJC) that PAKMIL had reported that they had been fired upon
At 0104 NATO RC-E communicated this to the GFTL.
Further requests for engagement were denied.
At 0151 PAKMIL presence was confirmed and all air assets were ordered to disengage from the area.
|
Shortly after mid-night NATO aircraft began firing at a border post on the Pakistani side of the border named “Volcano”. The border post was manned by 8 soldiers equipped with light weapons and no major anti-aircraft weapons.
PAKMIL believed that they were under attack.
Shortly before the attack, NATO personnel at the BCC requested confirmation as to the existence of PAKMIL in a specific area. Coordinates were provided and being reviewed by PAKMIL when the attack began. No confirmation could be provided because the information was incomplete. PAKMIL responded by asking for more information. The NATO officer apologized for sending incorrect coordinates and confirmed that NATO forces had attacked the Volcano post.
A report of the attack was immediately communicated to the Director General of Military Operations at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi who activated the Centrix communication network and informed his counterparts at ODRP Islamabad, ISAF HQ Kabul and Cent-Com HQ, Tampa about the attack on the Pakistani post.
According to PAKMIL, NATO had been notified that they were firing on PAKMIL forces yet the attacks continued for some period thereafter.
A nearby post referred to as “Boulder” fired illuminating rounds in an effort to assist PAKMIL located at the Volcano post. Rescue teams dispatched on foot to save personnel at both posts were fired on.
U.S. told their Pakistani counterparts that they were calling off the engagement and that the helicopters are returning back. Nevertheless the attack continued until approximately 0220 [Pakistani Time] AM. [Note: The time difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan time is 30 minutes. Pakistan time is 30 minutes ahead of Afghan time.]
|
|
Acknowledgement of incident.
|
During the engagement, HQs and individuals did not respond correctly, quickly enough, or with the sense of urgency or initiative required given the gravity of the situation and the well-known sensitivity surrounding the Afghan-Pakistan border region.
|
All U.S. and ISAF contacts acknowledged the fact that U.S. helicopters and gunships had attacked Pakistani post. The complete U.S./ISAF chain of command knew no later than 0115 hours what had happened.
|
|
Actions in self-defense:
|
Continued fire from Pakistani positions exacerbated the situation.
|
PAKMIL maintains that the Pakistani troops were trying to rescue their fallen and injured comrades. The rescue team sent by Pakistan Army came under heavy fire from gunship helicopters and suffered heavy casualties. Any engagement by PAKMIL was in self-defense.
|
|
Rules of Engagement:
|
The rules of engagement give NATO forces an inherent right of self-defense against any threat. The US forces engaged a target within the vicinity of Pakistani area.
The attack continued even after the incident was reported to U.S. forces.
|
PAKMIL claims that the rules of engagement between U.S. and Pakistan forces do not provide any exception for hot pursuit and NATO forces had no authority to enter Pakistan airspace.
PAKMIL claims that under the rules of engagement both forces shall cease fire once the communication contact is established. PAKMIL alleges that NATO’s failure to cease firing on PAKMIL after notification they were notified that they were firing on PAKMIL was violation of the rules of engagement.
|
|
International Law of Armed Conflict:
|
U.S. forces observed the International law of Armed Conflict.
|
According to PAKMIL, NATO violated the principal of proportionality under the International law of Armed Conflict by responding with F-15, AH-64 and AC-130 against a few [perceived] mortars and machine gun fires.
|
|
Mistrust:
|
Border area coordination and cooperation was hampered by a climate of mutual distrust. A lack of clarity surrounding procedures, [standard operating procedures] and directives for cross-border coordination and cooperation contributed negatively to the 25.26 November 2011 incident.
|
According to PAKMIL, very detailed and elaborate coordination procedures and mechanism exist between U.S./NATO and PAKMIL, including coordination conferences, Centrix exchange, border flag meetings, regular trilateral meetings between U.S., Pakistani and Afghan forces at every level from top regional commanders down to company commanders. Such coordination mechanism, if properly implemented, would have prevented the incident and prevented the deaths of 24 Pakistani troops.
|
Latest Tweets